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This Court has jurisdiction to decide this appeal under Utah Code Ann. 
§ 78A-3-102(3)G). 
II. ISSUE PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
Did the required six jurors have sufficient evidence to find Kachina 
more than 49% at fault for the accident that injured her, where she was 
using a pedestrian walkway on ARS' s property as a walking path and 
slipped on a patch of invisible black ice which was known to be a recurring 
safety issue affecting the pedestrian walkway by ARS, the causes of which 
ARS had not adequately repaired despite their knowledge? 
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This issue is preserved on appeal as it was raised by Plaintiff-
~ Appellant's Motion for New Trial filed in the District Court on July 15th, 
2015. 
APPLICABLE STANDARD OF APPELLATE REVIEW 
"A trial court has discretion in determining whether to grant or deny a 
~ motion for a new trial, and [appellate courts] will not reverse a trial court's 
decision absent clear abuse of that discretion." State v. Harmon, 956 P.2d 
262,266 (Utah 1998) (citing State v. Wetzel, 868 P.2d 64, 70 (Utah 1993). 
III. RULES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE OF OR 
OF CENTRAL IMPORTANCE TO THIS APPEAL 
part: 
Rule 59 of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure provides , in pertinent 
(a)Grounds. Except as limited by Rule 61, a new trial may be 
granted to any party on any issue for any of the following 
reasons: 
(a)(6) insufficiency of the evidence to justify the verdict or other 
decision ... 
Utah Code Ann. § 78B-5-818 provides, in pertinent part: 
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(2) A person seeking recovery may recover from any defendant or 
~ group of defendants whose fault, combined with the fault of persons 
immune from suit and nonparties to whom fault is allocated, exceeds the 
vi) fault of the person seeking recovery prior to any reallocation of fault made 
under Subsection 78B-5-819(2). 
IV. STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
A. NATURE OF PROCEEDING 
This personal injury case arose from a slip-and-fall accident that 
occurred at about 4:47 PM on Friday December 28, 2012, on the icy 
northwest store walkway of Defendant-Appellee ARS's property located at 
680 East 400 South in Salt Lake City. 
This case was tried before the Honorable Judge Paige Peterson on 
June 16-19, 2015. The jury unanimously determined that both Ms. Choate 
and ARS Fresno had causal fault; but the required number of six jurors 
determined that Ms. Choate had more harm-causing fault than ARS did; 
and so the jury never determined the amount of Ms. Choate's damages 
sustained as a result of the subject incident. The Court entered Judgment 
in favor of ARS on July 2, 2015. Ms. Choate moved for a new trial under 
URCP 59(a) on July 15, 2015. 
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As a result of the incident, Ms. Choate sustained significant and 
..;; lasting, inoperable, left foot and ankle injuries and bilateral plantar fasciitis 
that causes pain and renders her less mobile. The trial Court should have 
~ granted a new trial on Plaintiff's motion for the same, and she now appeals 
that decision. 
B. FACTUAL BACKGROUND AND BRIEF HISTORY OF 
PROCEEDINGS 
Plaintiff-Appellant Kachina Choate was injured on December 28th, 
2012 at 4:47 PM. (R. III.108). It was the first day since Christmas that it had 
not snowed in Salt Lake City, and temperatures had been freezing or near 
it at the airport since the holiday (R. 111.72-75). Kachina was walking with 
her mother, Bernadine Choate around the vicinity of the Shell convenience 
store owned by Defendant-Appellee ARS Fresno LLC. 
Kachina and Bernadine were in the area that day to do some grocery 
shopping. There was a break in the weather after three days with snow, 
Bernadine called it "warmer than it had been," although the two were still 
dressed warmly (R. I. 9). Both Bernadine and Kachina were wearing tennis 
shoes (R.I.10, 111.96). Kachina was carrying a grocery bag or possibly two 
from their stop at Whole Foods in addition to her purse (R. III. 98). 
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Kachina and her mother walked along the public sidewalk, navigating 
;.:iJ some clearly visible accumulated ice and snow without incident (R. I. 11). 
Kachina testified that she'd never had issues navigating winter conditions 
~ in the shoes she was wearing prior to the accident (R. III. 154). Kachina's 
")1 ~ 
shoes were admitted into evidence and are in good repair. 
The Choate' s continued along the sidewalk on 700 East until they got 
to the corner of ARS's property, the Shell gas station, and then decided to 
take a shortcut through the property (R. I. 12). The two had taken this 
route before; the pair would make a few stops at local grocery stores, 
parking at Smith's, heading to Whole Foods and then visiting Trader Joe's 
before returning home (R.1.6). They had taken the shortcut through ARS's 
parking lot before on their way from Whole Foods to Trader Joe's (R.I.12). 
Normally Kachina and Bernadine would walk through the parking lot or 
gas pump area in front of the Shell station (R.1.13). 
On December 28th, 2012, Kachina and Bernadine took a different 
route through ARS's property (R. 1.13). There were several cars parked at 
the pumps and the two walked between the pumps and the front of the 
store itself to avoid them (R. III.101). While walking on the asphalt in front 
of the store, Kachina observed a car pulling into the property towards them 
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and stepped up onto the concrete walkway at the front of the store to avoid 
v;, it (R. IIl.102). 
Kachina observed that the walkway appeared wet, but did not see 
@ any accumulated ice (R. III. 103). She walked across the sidewalk in a 
normal fashion, and after 3 steps without incident, she slipped on a patch 
of black ice and fell suddenly to the concrete sidewalk, landing with her 
left leg bent (R. III. 106). Bernadine, who was walking behind her, 
observed that she had fallen suddenly and landed awkwardly (R. I. 36). 
Kachina had slipped on black ice which had accumulated on ARS's 
pedestrian walkway (variously referred to in testimony as the sidewalk, 
walkway and "catwalk" (R. Il.111)). Kachina was unable to see the ice 
before falling, but once on the ground, she saw and felt it. (R.111.107, III. 
124). Bernadine approached to find that Kachina had been injured in the 
fall. (R. 1.17). Bernadine then entered the store to fill out an accident report 
while Kachina remained seated on the ground in front of the store for three 
to five minutes (R. III. 149). Kachina was able to regain her feet and hobble 
into the store where she maintained her feet by leaning against the counter 
while talking with Stefan Jennings, the clerk on duty (R. I. 50-51). 
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There was a discussion between the Choates and Mr. Jennings at the 
.iJ counter which involved discussions of calling an ambulance for Kachina 
(R. III. 114). Kachina declined to incur the expense of an ambulance at that 
@ time as she was unable to pay for it (R. III. 115). 1 
The black ice had formed due to a persistent dripping of water 
vii through the seams in the roof that occurred due to a structural defect in the 
building (R. IL 159-61). The building's overhang, which covered the 
sidewalk, was leaking water through the soffit from an uncertain cause. (R. 
IL 159). It was observed by multiple employees of ARS, including both 
Stefan Jennings and David Edward Marshall (R.IL22, II.159). The issue was 
a long-standing one that was discussed among ARS employees (R.II. 165-
66). Stefan Jennings observed the leak through the roof soffit, with water 
coming down steadily at the rate of 7-8 drips per minute (R. Il.53). The 
dripping water would cause a buildup of ice when the temperature was 
cold enough (R.IL53). When incompletely attended to by the employees of 
ARS, the area could get very slick (R. II.54), because of a tendency for the 
1 There was testimony at trial that during the conversation there was a request by one or both of the 
Choates for $50 in compensation for the accident or to go to the doctor (R. II. 129). Ms Choate testified 
(iJ that she never asked Mr. Jennings for $50 (R. III. 115). But Ms. Choate did testify that during discussions 
about the ambulance she recalls asking Mr. Jennings something similar to "who's going to pay for [the 
ambulance]? you?" (R. III. 115). 
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water coming down to freeze in the area of the accident and cause a 
~ potentially hazardous situation (R. IL 22). 
The ice that formed on the walkway was not only slippery but nearly 
(ii invisible "black ice" (R. IL55). It was a concern that Jennings noticed, and 
also had been brought to his attention by customers of the store who had 
liP encountered it and reported the slippery hazard (R.IL57). The spot was a 
repeated concern for ARS' s employees, not just because of the ice, but also 
because of the sloping of the adjacent walking paths and curbing (R. Il.59). 
It was the practice of employees at the Shell station to put out ice melt on 
the trouble spot, early if possible to curtail the ice forming (R. II. 167). 
Jennings had familiarity with the hazard, and testified that there was 
no reason Kachina would have been able to determine the spot was icy as 
opposed to just wet like the other areas of the walkway by just looking at it 
(R. IL66). Other testimony confirmed the pattern of black ice forming that 
was very difficult or nearly impossible to see (R. IL 171). Employees of 
ARS did not bring the issue to their boss's attention, testifying that they 
were never told to do so (R. IL 161). Tonya Howard, a district manager for 
12 of ARS's stores was made aware of the problem with water leaking 
through the soffit in several of ARS's stores which were similarly 
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constructed (R. III. 11-13). Tonya Howard also testified that employees 
·~ should have been trained on the policy and use of a "communications 
journal" to appropriately escalate maintenance issues like the leaking roof 
~ to management, but were not appropriately instructed (R. III. 14-15). So 
despite the fact that Jennings heard from regular customers to the store that 
,it) it was a trouble spot, saw water coming down, and knew it posed a danger 
to pedestrians on the walkway, he didn't report it to his superiors (R. 
II.138). 
There was various testimony regarding the cause and experts gave 
their opinions to the jury. Plaintiff's expert, Timothy Wyatt, visited the 
store on August 19th, and was able to observe the property during a 
rainstorm (R. III. 36). Mr. Wyatt observed that the top of the parapet wall 
around the building's roof was improperly sloped, which would allow 
water to flow toward the front of the store, possibly causing the dripping 
(R. III. 77). Mr. Wyatt was also able to directly observe water coming 
through the soffit in the overhang during the rainstorm (R. III. 38-39). 
There was some discussion that the lights in the overhang or the heat from 
the building may have contributed to the melting of snow that had settled 
on the building (R. III. 43). 
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At the trial, Mr. Jennings testified he was 90% sure he had placed ice 
~ melt on the pedestrian walkway between the start of his shift on December 
28th and the incident (R. IL 44-45). Mr. Jennings testified that ARS 
@ employees were instructed to put down ice melt every hour (R. IL 44). 
Jennings also testified that there was some difficulty in addressing both the 
l.;i} safety of the premises and dealing with customers due to ARS' s practice of 
utilizing 'single coverage,' leaving only one employee at the store at a time 
(R. IL 47). Mr. Jennings clocked in at 2:53 PM, and Ms. Choate was injured 
at 4:47 PM (R. IL 73). 
Both Kachina and Bernadine testified that while speaking with Mr. 
Jennings after the accident he mentioned that he forgot, or may have 
forgotten, or didn't have time to place ice melt (R.L21, III. 113). Robert Ray 
Duncan, a manager with ARS who arrived on the scene after the Choate' s 
were already on their way to the hospital claimed to have observed ice melt 
on the walkway as well as taking a number of photographs (R. IL 107-108). 
The photographs were not in existence at the time of the trial. Mr. Jennings 
testified that he did not place ice melt between the time of the accident and 
the time that Mr. Duncan arrived, meaning the ice melt Mr. Duncan 
observed would have to have been placed before the accident. Both 
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Kachina and Bernadine testified that they did not see, or did not recall 
..ii1 seeing ice melt on the walkway prior to the accident (R.I.38, R.III. 125, 127). 
The Trial Court, in its Order denying Ms. Choate's motion for a new 
@ trial addresses the relevant evidence presented regarding the fault of the 
parties (Addendum 1). 
1. [S]RS's employee, Stefan Jennings ("Jennings"), knew 
that, at times, the northeast corner of the sidewalk in front of 
ARS' s store would become slippery with "black ice" when 
water leaking from the roof would freeze; that knowledge is 
imputed to ARS; and ARS did not inspect the roof or fix the 
roof leak; 
2. ARS should have kept a communications journal 
pertaining to safety issues, and there was no evidence that 
Jennings was trained to pass on information in the 
communications journal; 
3. There was no warning provided by ARS to pedestrians 
on its store sidewalk concerning the slippery conditions on the 
walk, including warning cones; 
4. Plaintiff and her mother, Bernadine Choate, offered 
disputed evidence that there was no ice melt placed on the 
sidewalk at the time of the Accident; 
5. ARS had single coverage at the time of the Accident, but 
there was overlapping coverage by Jennings and another 
employee David Marshall in the hours prior to the Accident; 
6. The northeast corner of the sidewalk was known to be 
slippery at times, but was not barricaded off to prevent 
pedestrians from using it; 
7. Plaintiff slipped and fell on "black ice" in the area of the 
northeast corner of the sidewalk where Mr. Jennings had seen 
it." 
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Addressing evidence showing Ms. Choate' s comparative negligence, 
the lower court furthered ordered: 
1. There were three days of snow and below freezing 
temperatures before the Accident, the Accident happened at 
dusk or sunset, and this evidence should have alerted plaintiff 
to be more careful and for Jennings to provide a warning to 
pedestrians; 
2. Jennings provided disputed testimony that he was 90 
percent sure that he had placed ice melt prior to the Accident, 
and when another employee, Ray Duncan, came to the store to 
assist in finding an accident report, Mr. Duncan saw and 
photographed ice melt, Jennings did not place any ice melt after 
the Accident was reported to him and before Mr. Duncan 
arrived, and the placement of ice melt should have made the 
walkway less slippery and alerted plaintiff to the possibility of 
danger; 
3. Plaintiff was wearing tennis shoes and knew she would 
be walking a number of blocks prior to the Accident, the shoes 
she was wearing were shown to the jury and were entered into 
evidence, and the jury must have factored in the type of shoes 
plaintiff was wearing and given it the weight it deserved; 
4. Plaintiff was carrying a purse and grocery bags from 
items purchased at Whole Foods, and it could have affected her 
balance and it could have been considered by the jury in 
whether she was able to catch herself at the time she fell; 
5. Plaintiff admitted that the sidewalk looked wet before she 
stepped onto it (at a place south of where Jennings had 
observed the "black ice" condition) and, though she walked 
several steps before she encountered the icy area, the presence 
of below-freezing temperatures should have alerted plaintiff of 
the potential for slippery conditions; and, 
6. Plaintiff and Bernadine Choate took a shortcut through 
the store's property and, because the jury is presumed to have 
found that the plaintiff was not a trespasser, the path chosen by 
plaintiff to walk through the store property could have caused 
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the jury to conclude that there was some danger in choosing 
this path" 
[ ... ]Testimony by a number of witnesses at trial was that 
the sidewalk was not consistently dangerous, but depended on 
weather conditions[ ... ]" 
[ ... ]The jury considered disputed issues at trial, including 
whether ice melt was placed on the sidewalk before the 
Accident and where the Accident took place in comparison to 
the roof leak, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have 
decided in favor of either party." 
(Addendum 1 Order Denying Plaintiff's Motion for New Trial 
and Granting, In Part, and Denying, In Part, Defendant's Verified 
Memorandum of Costs) 
The Jury found that ARS was at fault, that ARS' s fault was a cause of 
Kachina's harm, that Kachina was at fault, and that Kachina's fault was a 
cause of her harm (Addendum 2 Verdict). The required six jurors found 
that Kachina was 60% at fault and the jury did not reach the issue of 
damages (Addendum 2). 
V. SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Kachina Choate was acting as a reasonably careful and unlucky 
~ pedestrian taking a shortcut. She was injured on a pedestrian walkway 
which periodically developed a serious safety hazard for pedestrians due 
vi> to an unaddressed structural defect which was known to ARS. A jury 
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lacked sufficient evidence to determine that Choate was 60% at fault where 
;i) ARS knew of the defect and failed to make it's premises safe. 
The path Kachina chose through ARS's property was irrelevant to the 
allocation of fault, as she'd already stepped onto a pedestrian walkway and 
gotten safely underway when she hit the hazard which caused her injury. 
The allocation of liability should be made on the basis of the relative 
culpability of both parties and under a duration analysis or multiplicity of 
acts analysis, the finding that ARS was anything less than 51 % at fault is 
manifestly against the weight of the evidence. Pedestrians in and around 
shops are not acting unreasonable in carrying shopping bags or wearing 
tennis shoes, and to the extent Kachina should have noticed ice melt on 
ARS' s walkway and acted with increased caution in traversing the area, the 
hidden and insidious nature of the hazard presented by recurrently 
forming black ice meant that ARS was still more at fault for the accident 
which injured Ms. Choate where ARS's actions in addressing the hazard 
were manifestly and evidently insufficient to make their premises safe. 
VI. ARGUMENT 
The Jury's Verdict That ARS Was Causally At Fault Was Appropriate. 
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"The owner of a business is not a guarantor that his business invitees 
~ will not slip and fall ... [h]e is charged with the duty to use reasonable care 
to maintain the floor of his establishment in a reasonably safe condition for 
vi) his patrons."Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 67, ,r 25, 196 P.3d 576,582 (quoting 
Schnuphase v. Storehouse Markets, 918 P.2d 476,478 (Utah 1996)) (internal 
;.i) quotation marks omitted) 
Owners of presmises are liable where there exists II some unsafe 
condition of a permanent nature, such as: in the structure of the building, 
[ ... ]which was created or chosen by the defendant (or his agents), or for 
which he is responsible. Allen v. Federated Dairy Farms, Inc., 538 P.2d 175, 
176 (Utah 1975). 
"[I]n cases where temporary unsafe conditions are created by owners, 
the notice requirement also does not apply. We emphasize, however, that 
"negligence will not be presumed" in either permanent or temporary 
unsafe condition cases.[ .. .I]n temporary unsafe condition cases, a plaintiff 
also must prove that the owner acted negligently either in creating or 
failing to remedy the temporary unsafe condition. Jex v. JRA, Inc., 2008 UT 
67, ,r 26, 196 P.3d 576,582 (Internal citations omitted). 
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The evidence at trial demonstrated that ARS knew of both a 
~ structural defect in the roof of their building, as well as the recurrent 
development of dangerous black ice on a pedestrian walkway beneath that 
~ roof as a result of the structural defect. The expert testimony provided at 
trial, both by Plaintiff and Defendant's experts, suggested that the defect 
~ and resulting dangerous condition on the walkway should have been 
repaired upon discovery of the same. 
Further evidence, including the testimony of Tonya Howard, showed 
systemic failures on the part of ARS to address the hazard on their 
walkway, including the lack of a communications journal for Stefan 
Jennings to escalate to his superiors the complaints of customers who had 
witnessed the slippery condition on the walkway and reported to him. The 
systemic failures in this case were even more egregious, as Ms. Howard 
testified that there were leaks and structural issues with a number of ARS's 
stores of similar construction to the store where Kachina Choate was 
injured. 
ARS failed in its duty to make it's premises safe. The jury's finding 
that they were at fault for Kachina's injury in slipping on the pedestrian 
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walkway in front of the store confirms that there was a danger which had 
~ been inadequately addressed. 
The Jury's Verdict That Kachina was More At Fault Than ARS Was 
~ Against The Manifest Weight of the Evidence. 
In determining the relative fault of the parties, 11 the kind of 
comparison of fault that a jury ought to make[ in] allocate[ing] liability 
should be made on the basis of the relative culpability of both parties. 
Harris v. Utah Transit Auth., 671 P.2d 217,222 (Utah 1983). 
In Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495; 497-99 (Utah 1996), a II dog-
confrontation" case, the Supreme Court reversed (915 P.2d 495, 497-99) the 
trial court's denial of the plaintiff's Rule 59(a)(6)-based motion for a new 
trial in a situation where the jury had determined that the plaintiff's 
injuries were 50% attributable to her own negligence. The court there held 
(id. at 499), citing Nelson, 657 P.2d 730, 732 (Utah 1982), that" the evidence 
in support of the jury's finding of fifty percent contributory negligence is so 
slight and unconvincing as to make the verdict plainly unreasonable and 
unjust." (Emphasis added). 
In Sharp, a mail carrier encountered a dog while taking a shortcut 
across the defendant's lawn, the Utah Supreme Court gave, 915 P.2d at 497-
19 
99, short shrift to the defense contention that taking a shortcut was 
vi) evidence of negligence. Just as the Sharp court concluded, id. at 498-99, that 
the plaintiff letter carrier could not be considered negligent for cutting 
~ across the defendant's lawn because he could reasonably assume that the 
dog was inside the house as he always had been on prior deliveries, Ms. 
~ Choate should not be considered negligent for cutting across the ARS 
property. For she had no reason to think there would be any danger 
lurking on the northeast corner of a pedestrian walkway in front of the 
store, an area that other people frequently walked in and one of whose 
recurrent hazardous condition she, unlike ARS, had no prior knowledge. 
The jury could reasonably have found some negligence on the part of 
Kachina Choate (if, for example, the jury determined that Mr. Jennings had 
applied some icemelt, it might have reasonably determined that there were 
icemelt remnants that Ms. Choate should have noticed and that she should 
therefore have proceeded more slowly, or that she should have walked 
around the area.) The other points of the trial court's ruling regarding 
evidence of negligence are slight and unconvincing and do not adequately 
account for the culpability analysis suggested by Harris 671 P.2d 217. 
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Kachina was wearing shoes when she slipped (trial Ex. 13). They 
~ were tennis shoes; but they have good tread and are fit for wintertime use; 
and she'd slipped on no surface during her pedestrian shopping loop, even 
l;J} while navigating visible ice and snow buildup that was slippery, until she 
hit the hazardous and invisible black ice at the scene of the tort. 
It was not unreasonable for Ms. Choate to make use of a pedestrian 
walkway that culminated in the hazardous spot, rather than following the 
more diagonal route that she normally followed through the parking lot. 
As she explained, she took the path she took so she and her mother, 
witness Bernadine Choate, could avoid the cars that were on the property; 
and she had no reason to think there was anything dangerous in the route 
she took. It is certainly not unreasonable for a pedestrian to be on a 
pedestrian walkway when the alternative is a parking lot where she would 
be walking in the path of oncoming automobiles. 
It was not unreasonable for Ms. Choate to walk at the normal 
walking pace which she was walking when she encountered the black ice. 
Ms. Choate took several steps before encountering the hidden danger, and 
it was reasonable for her to expect that ARS would maintain its walkway in 
a safe manner throughout, she certainly could not have reasonably been 
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expected to anticipate the black ice that formed as a result of an 
~ unaddressed structural defect. Kachina and her mother both testified that 
the walkway just looked "wet," and that it didn't feel slippery as they 
~ walked along. 
There was no evidence of any use of drugs or alcohol, or of 
viP horseplay, misconduct, or inattention on the part of Ms. Chaote, and all this 
should further minimize the overall amount of fault Ms. Chaote should 
iiP reasonably have been assigned even if the jury accepted Mr. Duncan's 
testimony that icemelt was present when he got there and Mr. Jenning's 
testimony that he didn't apply any ice melt after the incident had occurred. 
Ms. Choate was carrying shopping bags in front of a retail 
establishment and using a pedestrian walkway as a walkway. There was 
nothing unreasonable about her conduct, she was simply the unlucky 
pedestrian who brought attention to the hazard on ARS's property by her 
injury, as opposed to the lucky pedestrians who had encountered the 
hazard previously without falling and had brought it to ARS' s attention by 
reporting it to Mr. Jennings. 
The Trial Court Erred in Not Granting Ms. Choate's Motion For A 
New Trial 
22 
In personal injury negligence actions, Utah law provides relief for a 
vJ party on motion to be granted a new trial on the basis of insufficiency of 
the evidence. E.G. King v. Union Pac. R. Co., 212 P.2d 692, 694-97 (Utah 
~ 1949); Stack v. Keames, 221 P.2d 594, 596-97 (Utah 1950); Marshall v. 
Ogend U.R. & D. Co., 221 P.2d 868, 869-70 (Utah 1950); Holmes v. Nelson, 
..;;J 326 P.2d 722 (Utah 1958)(see especially the elucidating concurring opinion 
of Justice Crockett, id. at 725-26); Wellman v. Noble, 366 P.2d 730, 731-33 
~ (Utah 1982); Sharp v. Williams, 915 P.2d 495; 497-99 (Utah 1996); and Ortiz 
v. Geneva Rock Prods., 939 P.2d 1213, 1216-18 (Utah App. 1997). 
,'-::\ \JD 
Sharp and Ortiz reversed trial court results and ordered new trials. 
The other cases affirmed trial judges' determinations that Rule 59(a)(6)-
based new trials should be granted in the aftermath of defense verdicts. 
In Nelson v. Trujillo, the Utah Supreme Court explained that "[t]he 
trial judge has broad latitude in granting or denying a motion for a new 
trial, and will not be overturned on appeal absent an abuse of discretion." 
(657 P.2d at 731) and (Id. at 732). 
[w]here the trial court has [ruled on] the motion for a new trial, its 
decision will be sustained on appeal if the record contains 'substantial 
competent evidence which would support a verdict for the [moving party]' 
23 
(quoting from King. V. Union Pac. R. Co., cited above; emphasis supplied 
~ by the court). 
Instructive Case Law from Other Jurisdictions. 
Case law from several other states is also instructive. In weilheim v. 
Great Falls, 685 P.2d 350,351 (Mont. 1984), the court upheld the trial court's 
~ granting of a new trial in a situation where the first jury had fixed the 
plaintiff's comparative fault at 90% and the defendant's at 10%. 
In Lehmkuhl v. Bolland, 757 P.2d 1222, 1224-26 (Ida. App. 1988), the 
court reversed the trial court's failure to grant the plaintiff's motion for 
new trial in a case in which the first jury found that the plaintiff was 50% at 
fault, on the basis that "the jury's assessment of negligence equally 
between [the plaintiff and the defendant motor vehicle driver] was against 
the great weight of the evidence." Id. at 1226 
Examining the comparative fault of the parties in this case makes it 
clear that the evidence of contributory negligence here is slight and 
unconvincing and the verdict itself is plainly unreasonable and unjust and 
certainly against the great weight of the evidence. 
There was an abundance of trial evidence of ARS's failure to exercise 
reasonable care. The following are some examples. Stefan Jennings (the 
24 
ARS employee who had been informed of customers' reports of the slick 
,..;; condition and who knew of the hazardous condition of the black ice that 
there formed and of its insidious, nearly invisible nature; 11 you wouldn't 
~ think it was a dangerous spot. It doesn't look like it at all" was part of his 
deposition testimony that came into evidence) received essentially no 
viJ training on safety issues, including on what to do once he discovered a 
dangerous condition. There was no II communication journal" in the store, 
~ of the kind witness Tonya Howard, the former ARS district manager, said 
was supposed to be at the store so employees could report - for effective 
company response - dangerous conditions. 
There had been, according to Ms. Howard, incidents of water leaking 
through the soffit of other ARS buildings of similar construction. The roof 
was known to the company, through the knowledge of witness Dave 
Marshall, to be leaking in other places not far from the northeast corner 
where Mr. Jennings had noticed the problem and where the incident 
occurred. The roof was never even inspected. And it was not repaired. 
Mr. Jennings was on an island at the time of Ms. Choate's injury due 
to ARS's policy of 'single coverage' where only one clerk was in charge of 
the entire premises at a time. Given that it was suggested Mr. Jennings 
25 
should have been applying ice melt every hour, and certainly more as 
(;o needed given the persistent dangerous condition, his responsibilities to 
help customers [in the store] first, as he testified, reduced his ability to 
~ adequately address the known hazardous condition. 
Tim Wyatt, Ms. Choate' s liability expert, testified that it was 
..;;p unreasonable for ARS not to fix the problem when it had notice of it. 
Merlin Taylor, the ARS expert, also gave testimony helpful to Ms. Choate's 
case, including that it was likely a different problem with the building - the 
incorrectly sloped parapet wall in addition to or other than the leaking 
soffit observed by Mr. Wyatt, and one that would not be difficult or 
expensive to fix, that was the likely culprit. ARS, with the knowledge it 
had, did no roof inspection, did not fix the problem, did not cone off the 
hazardous area, did not place a warning sign, and did not make sure that 
enough icemelt, if any, was placed , in timely fashion, on the day of the 
incident. 
The most, it seems, that the jury could reasonably have concluded, 
regarding the conduct of Ms. Choate, is that she had momentary 
inattention or misjudgment as she approached the to-her-unknown danger 
~ 
zone. And the evidence of Ms. Choate's true negligence was dwarfed by 
26 
that of ARS, when viewed from the perspective of how long each incidence 
1.4/P of negligence lasted, as well as from a multiplicity-of-acts-of-negligence 
perspective. 
VIL CONCLUSION 
For the reasons argued above, Ms. Choate requests this Court reverse 
the Trial Court's ruling and grant her a new trial under Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure 59(a)(6) as there was insufficient evidence to support the verdict 
that she was 60% at fault. 
Respectfully submitted this 16th day of June, 2016 
;;? 
~//, I :i-r-
,eevi H. Cazier= 
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant. 
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I certify that on June 16th, 2016, I caused to be served two (2) copies of the 
foregoing by mailing the same, first class, to: J. Angus Edwards, Attorney 
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The Order of Court is stated below: ,. · =,;J · .:<,. \~ 
Dated: November 04, 2015 Isl PAIGa PE1:~EN J 
08:20:38 PM District-.r_9µrt Jftd.ie,/ 
~-•• ~ .. ~·; I l ,}, \;;, .. ,,,' 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KACHINA CHOATE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARS FRESNO LLC, a California limited 
liability company, 
Defendant. 
ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFF'S 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL and 
GRANTING, IN PART, AND 
DENYING, IN PART, DEFENDANT'S 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF 
COSTS 
Civil Case No.130907594 PI 
Judge Paige Petersen 
This matter came before the Court and was heard on October 15, 2015, to consider 
plaintiffs Motion for New Trial (the "Motion") and defendant's Verified Memorandum of Costs 
and Disbursements (the "Verified Memorandum"). J. Angus Edwards of JONES WALDO 
HOLBROOK & McDONOUGH appearing on behalf of defendant ARS Fresno LLC ("ARS") 
and Peter C. Collins appearing on behalf of plaintiff Kachina Choate. The Court having 
reviewed the memoranda supporting and opposing the Motion and Verified Memorandum, 
having heard the arguments of counsel, having reconsidered the evidence offered at trial, and 
having observed that the jurors were attentive during trial, and being fully advised and good and 
sufficient cause appearing therefor, it is hereby 
MOTION FOR NEW TRIAL 
ORDERED that the primary issue in considering the Motion is whether the jury verdict 
finding plaintiff 60 percent negligent and ARS 40 percent negligent for a slip-and-fall accident at 
4:47 p.m. on December 28, 2012 (the "Accident"), had sufficient evidence for the jury to reach 
its verdict, not whether this Court would have made the same findings, and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that the jury made credibility findings in reaching its verdict that plaintiff 
was 60 percent negligent and ARS was 40 percent negligent, and this Court will defer to the 
jury's findings, and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that plaintiff and ARS each offered relevant evidence concerning the 
negligence of ARS and the comparative negligence of plaintiff, including the following evidence 
showing ARS's negligence: 
1. SRS's employee, Stefan Jennings ("Jennings"), knew that, at times, the 
northeast corner of the sidewalk in front of ARS' s store would become 
slippery with "black ice" when water leaking from the roof would freeze; 
that knowledge is imputed to ARS; and ARS did not inspect the roof or fix 
the roof leak; 
2. ARS should have kept a communications journal pertaining to safety 
issues, and there was no evidence that Jennings was trained to pass on 
information in the communications journal; 
3. There was no warning provided by ARS to pedestrians on its store 
sidewalk concerning the slippery conditions on the walk, including 
warning cones; 
4. Plaintiff and her mother, Bernadine Choate, offered disputed evidence that 
there was no ice melt placed on the sidewalk at the time of the Accident; 
5. ARS had single coverage at the time of the Accident, but there was 
overlapping coverage by Jennings and another employee David Marshall 
in the hours prior to the Accident; 
6. The northeast comer of the sidewalk was known to be slippery at times, 
but was not barricaded off to prevent pedestrians from using it; 
7. Plaintiff slipped and fell on "black ice" in the area of the northeast comer 
of the sidewalk where Mr. Jennings had seen it; and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that the evidence showing that plaintiff was comparatively negligent is as 
follows: 
I . There were three days of snow and below freezing temperatures before the 
Accident, the Accident happened at dusk or sunset, and this evidence 
should have alerted plaintiff to be more careful and for Jennings to provide 
a warning to pedestrians; 
2. Jennings provided disputed testimony that he was 90 percent sure that he 
had placed ice melt prior to the Accident, and when another employee, 
Ray Duncan, came to the store to assist in finding an accident report, Mr. 
Duncan saw and photographed ice melt, Jennings did not place any ice 
melt after the Accident was reported to him and before Mr. Duncan 
arrived, and the placement of ice melt should have made the walkway less 
slippery and alerted plaintiff to the possibility of danger; 
3. Plaintiff was wearing tennis shoes and knew she would be walking a 
number of blocks prior to the Accident, the shoes she was wearing were 
shown to the jury and were entered into evidence, and the jury must have 
factored in the type of shoes plaintiff was wearing and given it the weight 
it deserved; 
4. Plaintiff was carrying a purse and grocery bags from items purchased at 
Whole Foods, and it could have affected her balance and it could have 
been considered by the jury in whether she was able to catch herself at the 
time she fell; 
5. Plaintiff admitted that the sidewalk looked wet before she stepped onto it 
(at a place south of where Jennings had observed the "black-ice" 
condition) and, though she walked several steps before she encountered 
the icy area, the presence of below-freezing temperatures should have 
alerted plaintiff of the potential for slippery conditions; and, 
6. Plaintiff and Bernadine Choate took a shortcut through the store's property 
and, because the jury is presumed to have found that the plaintiff was not a 
trespasser, the path chosen by plaintiff to walk through the store property 
could have caused the jury to conclude that there was some danger in 
choosing this path; and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that the testimony by a number of witnesses at trial was that the sidewalk 
was not consistently dangerous, but depended on the weather conditions; 
ORDERED that although ARS employees had overlapping shifts in the hours before the 
JI-~ "'7 
Accident, but there was no testimony that employees took additional safety measures, and it is 
further 
ORDERED that the jury considered disputed issues at trial, including whether ice melt 
was placed on the sidewalk before the Accident and where the Accident took place in 
comparison to the roof leak, the evidence was sufficient for the jury to have decided in favor of 
either party, and this Court cannot reverse a finding that plaintiff was 60 percent negligent and 
ARS was 40 percent negligent, because of the credibility judgments in weighing the conflicting 
evidence, and it is further 
ORDERED that plaintiffs Motion for New Trial is denied. 
VERIFIED MEMORANDUM OF COSTS AND DISBURSEMENTS 
ORDERED ARS was the prevailing party within the meaning of Utah R. Civ. P. 54(d), 
and it is further hereby 
ORDERED ARS shall recover its Answer and Jury Demand fee of $250, the charge for 
service of the Stefan Jennings trial subpoena of $18.50, and seven $5.00 charges for Green Filing 
pleadings or discovery responses, for a total of $303 .50, and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that all charges for deposition transcripts or copies of depositions sought by 
ARS in its Verified Memorandum, and all charges for copies of trial exhibits, which total 
$1,682.16, shall be denied, and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that this Court has discretion to award costs to the prevailing party, unless it 
otherwise directs and this Court exercises its discretion to otherwise direct that the charges for 
depositions and copies of trial exhibits, although very desirable for ARS to prepare for trial, were 
1\1-,,--i...-- n,1 'ln-tr no.-,n nl\11 
not essential, and the preparation for trial and presentation of its defense at trial could have been 
accomplished by less expensive written discovery, and it is hereby further 
ORDERED that the Verified Memorandum is granted, in pa11, awarding $303.50 in costs 
and denied, in part, for $1,683.16 in costs. 
SO ORDERED AND ENTERED BY THE COURT 
(The Signature of the Court will Appear at the Top of the First Page) 
@ 
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APPROVED AS TO FORM: 
PETER C. COLLINS LLC 
By: /s/ Peter C. Collins (signed w/permission) 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT 
SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
KACHINA CHOATE, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
ARS - FRESNO LLC, a California 
limited liability company, 
Defendant. 
MEMBERS OF THE JURY: 
VERDICT 
Case No. 130907594PI 
Judge Paige Petersen 
{Tier 2) 
Please answer the following questions, in the order presented, and based on 
the Jury Instructions and the evidence presented in this case. If you find the 
greater weight of the evidence is in favor of the issue presented, answer "Yes." If 
you find the evidence is equally balanced or that the greater weight of evidence is 
against the issue, answer ''No." Also, any damages assessed must be proven by the 
greater weight of the evidence. 
.. 
(At least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they need not be 
the same six on each question. When six or more of you have agreed on the 
answer to each question that is required to be answered, your foreperson shall sign 
and date the form and advise the bailiff that you have reached a verdict.) 
QUESTION 1: Was ARS - Fresno at fault? 
ANSWER: Yes ✓ No __ 
If you answer "Yes," answer Question 2. If you answer ''No," stop 
here and have your foreperson sign this Verdict. 
QUESTION 2: Was ARS - Fresno's fault a cause of any harm to Kachina 
Choate? 
ANSWER: Yes y' No __ 
If you answer "Yes," answer Question 3. If you answer "No," stop 
here and have your foreperson date and sign this Verdict. 
QUESTION 3: Was Kachina Choate also at fault? 
ANSWER: Yes_d_ No. __ 
If you answer "Yes," answer Question 4. If you answer ''No," skip to 
Question 6. 
QUESTION 4: Was Kachina Choate's fault also a cause of her hann? 
ANSWER: Yes _d__ No. __ 
2 
., 
If you answer "Yes," answer Question 5. If you answer ''No," skip to 
Question 6. 
QUESTION 5: Assuming all the fault that caused harm to Ms. Choate totals 
100%, what percentage is attributable to: 
A. Defendant ARS - Fresno LLC: 
B. PlaintiffKachina Choate: 
TOTAL: 
_!:10_% 
~% 
100% 
Stop here if plaintiffKachina Choate's fault is 50% or more; do not answer 
Question 6. 
NOTE: Do not deduct from the following amount the percentage of 
fault, if any, that you have assessed to Ms. Choate. The judge will 
make any necessary deductions later. 
QUESTION 6: What amount, if any, would fairly compensate plaintiff 
Kachina Choate for her damages? 
$ __ _ 
DA TED this J9__ day of June, 2015. 
FOREPERSON 
3 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 
Members of the jury, we are about to begin the trial of this case. You have 
heard some details about this case dming the process of jury selection. Before the 
trial begins, however, there are certain instructions you should have to better 
understand what will be presented to you and how you should conduct yourself 
during the trial. 
The party who brings a lawsuit is called the plaintiff. In this case the 
plaintiff is Kachina Choate. The party against whom a suit is brought is called the 
defendant. In this case the defendant is ARS - Fresno LLC. 
By your verdict, you will decide disputed issues of fact. I will decide all 
questions of law that arise during the trial. Before you retire to deliberate at the 
close of the case, I will instruct you on the law that you must follow and apply in 
deciding your verdict. 
Because you will be called upon to decide the facts of this case, you should 
give careful attention to the testimony and other evidence presented for your 
consideration, bearing in mind that I will inst1uct you at the end of the trial 
concerning the manner in which you should determine the credibility or 
"believability" of each witness and the weight to be given the testimony. During 
the trial, however, you should keep an open mind and should not form or express 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (cont.) 
any opinion about the case one way or the other until you have heard all of the 
testimony and evidence, the closing arguments of the lawyers, and 1ny instructions 
to you on the law. 
While the trial is in progress, you must not discuss the case in any manner 
~ among yourselves or with anyone else, nor should you permit anyone to discuss it 
in your presence. 
From time to time during the trial, I may be called upon to make rulings of 
law on objections or motions made by the lawyers. It is the duty of the lawyer on 
each side of a case to object when the other side offers testhnony or other evidence 
that the lawyer believes is not properly adinissible. You should not be angry at a 
lawyer or the client because the lawyer has made objections. You should not infer 
or conclude from any ruling or other comment I may make that I have any opinion 
on the merits of the case favoring one side or the other. And if I sustain an 
~ objection to a question that goes unanswered by the witness, you should not draw 
any inference or conclusion :from the question itself. 
During the trial it may be necessary for me to confer with the lawyers out of 
your hearing with regard to questions of law or procedure that may require 
consideration by me. On some occasions you may be excused from the courtroom 
for the same reason. I will try to lhnit these intern1ptions as much as possible, but 
PRELI1vIINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 1 (cont.) 
you should re1ne1nber the iinportance of the matter you are here to determine, and 
should be patient even though the case may seem to go slowly. 
MUJI 1.1 (mod.) 
PRELIMINARY JURYINSTRUCTIONNO. 2 
The case will proceed in the following order: 
1. The plaintiffs lawyer may 1nake an opening statement outlining the 
case. The defendant's lawyer may also make an opening statement outlining the 
~ case immediately after the plaintiffs lawyer's statement, or may defer making an 
opening statement until the conclusion of the plaintiffs case. Neither side is 
required to make an opening statement. What is said in the opening statement is 
not evidence, but is simply designed to provide you with an introduction to the 
evidence the party making the statement intends to produce. 
2. The plaintiff will introduce evidence through testimony of witnesses 
and exhibits. At the conclusion of the plaintiffs case, the defendant may introduce 
evidence. The defendant, however, is not obligated to introduce any evidence or to 
call any witnesses. If the defendant introduces evidence, the plaintiff may then 
introduce rebuttal evidence. 
3. I will instruct you on the law which you are to apply in reaching your 
verdict. 
4. The parties 1nay present closing arguments to you as to what they 
believe the evidence has shown and the inferences which they contend you should 
draw from the evidence. What is said in a closing argument, just as what is said in 
PRELIIVIINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 2 (cont.) 
an opening statement, is not evidence. The arguments are designed to present to 
you the contentions of the parties based on the evidence introduced. The plaintiff 
has the right to open and to close the argument. 
MUJI 1.2 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 
The evidence in the case will consist of the sworn testhnony of the 
witnesses, regardless of who may have called them; and all exhibits received in 
evidence, regardless of who may have introduced them. 
Statements and arguments of lawyers are not evidence in the case, unless 
made as an admission or stipulation of fact. When the lawyers on both sides 
stipulate or agree to the existence of a fact, you must, unless otherwise instructed, 
accept the stipulation as evidence, and regard that fact as proved. 
I may take judicial notice of certain facts. If I declare that I will take judicial 
notice of s01ne fact, you must accept that fact as true. 
Any evidence as to which I sustain an objection, and any evidence I order to 
be stricken, must be entirely disregarded. 
Some evidence is admitted for a limited purpose only. If I instruct you that 
~ an item of evidence has been admitted for a limited purpose only, you must 
consider it only for that limited purpose and for no other. 
You are to consider only the evidence in the case. But in your consideration 
of the evidence, you are not limited to the bald statements of the witnesses. In 
other words, you are not limited solely to what you see and hear as the witnesses 
testify. You are permitted to draw, frmn the facts which you find have been 
@ 
® 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 3 (cont.) 
proved, such reasonable inferences as you feel are justified in light of your 
expenence. 
MUil 1.3 (1nod.) 
------- ·--~~~ . ~' 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 4 
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial 
evidence consists of facts or circumstances that allow someone to reasonably infer 
the truth of the facts to be proved. For example, if the fact to be proved is whether 
~ Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of 
the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the fact. If the witness testifies that she 
saw Johnny with cherries smeared on his face and an empty pie plate in his hand, 
that is circumstantial evidence of the fact. 
MUJI 2d CV120 
MUJI 2.7 
~ 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 
When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof or that a paiiy must 
prove something by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must 
persuade you, by the evidence presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be 
true than not true. 
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a 
reasonable doubt, but I 1nust emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a 
civil case such as this one, a different level of proof applies: proof by a 
preponderance of the evidence. 
Another way of saying this is proof by the greater weight of the evidence, 
however slight. Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of 
witnesses nor the amount of testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive 
character of the evidence. In weighing the evidence, you should consider all of the 
evidence that applies to a fact, no matter which party presented it. The weight to 
be given to each piece of evidence is for you to decide. 
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is 1nore likely 
true than not, then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, 
if you decide that the evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 5 (cont.) 
find that the fact has not been proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its 
burden of proof to establish that fact. 
Johns v. Shu/sen, 717 P.2d 1336 (Utah 1986) 
Morris v. Farmers Home Mut. Ins. Co., 500 P.2d 505 (Utah 1972) 
Alvarado v. Tucker, 268 P.2d 986 (Utah 1954) 
Hansen v. Hansen, 958 P.2d 931 (Utah App. 1998) 
MUJI 2d CVl 17 (submitted by ARS; last sentence deleted) 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 6 
After the evidence has been heard and arguments and instructions are 
concluded, you may retire to consider the evidence and arrive at your verdict. You 
will determine the facts from all the testimony you hear and the other evidence that 
is received. You are the sole judges of the facts. Neither I nor anyone else may 
invade your responsibility to act as judges of the facts. 
On the other hand, and with equal emphasis, I instruct you that you are 
bound to accept the rules of law that I give you whether you agree with them or 
not. 
MUJil.5 
:~ 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 7 
During this trial I will permit you to take notes. Many courts do not permit 
note-taking by jurors, and a word of caution is in order. There is always a 
tendency to attach undue importance to matters which one has written down. 
Some testimony that is considered unimportant at the time presented, and thus not 
written down, takes on greater importance later in the trial in light of all the 
evidence presented. Therefore, your notes are only a tool to aid your own 
individual memory and you should not compare your notes with other jurors in 
determining the content of any testimony or in evaluating the importance of any 
evidence. Your notes are not evidence, and are by no means a complete outline of 
the proceedings or a list of the highlights of the trial. Above all, your memory 
should be your greatest asset when it comes time to deliberate and render a 
decision in this case. 
MUJI 1.6 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 8 
Since this case involves an incident that occurred at a particular location, 
you may be tempted to visit the scene yourself. Please do not do so. In view of the 
thne that elapses before a case comes to trial, substantial changes may have 
..;;; occurred at the location after the event that gives rise to this lawsuit. Also, in 
making an unguided visit without the benefit of explanation, you might get 
erroneous impressions. Therefore, please avoid going to it or near it, if you can, 
until the case is over. 
MUJI 1.7 (mod.) 
-~ 
1.21 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 9 
At the end of trial, you must make your decision based on what you recall of 
the testimony. You will not have a transcript or recording of the witnesses' 
testhnony. I urge you to pay close attention to the testimony as it is given. 
MUJI 2d 
CV141 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 
You will not be required to remain together while we are in recess. It is 
important that you obey the following instructions with reference to the recesses of 
the court: 
1. Do not discuss the case either among yourselves or with anyone else 
during the trial. In fairness to the parties to this lawsuit, you should keep an open 
mind throughout the trial, reaching your conclusion only during the final 
deliberations. Only after all the evidence is in and you have heard the lawyers, 
summations and my instructions to you on the law, and only after an interchange of 
views with each other may you reach your conclusions. 
2. Do not permit any person to discuss the case in your presence. If 
anyone does so, despite your telling them not to, report that fact to me as soon as 
you are able. You should not, however, discuss with your fellow jurors either that 
fact, or any other fact that you feel necessary to bring to my attention. 
3. Though it is normal human tendency to converse with other people, 
please do not converse with any of the parties or their lawyers or any witnesses. 
By this, I mean not only do not converse about the case, but do not converse at all, 
even to pass the time of day. In no other way can all the patties be assured of the 
absolute hnpartiality they are entitled to expect from you as jurors. 
PRELIMINARY JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 10 ( cont.) 
4. There is unlikely to be any media coverage of this trial, but just in 
case: Do not read about the case in the newspapers, or listen to radio or television 
broadcasts about the trial. If a newspaper headline catches your eye, do not 
examine the article further. Media accounts may be inaccurate and may contain 
~ certain matters which are not proper evidence for your consideration. You must 
base your verdict solely on what you see and hear in this courtroom. 
-,J) 
5. Do not do any research or make any investigation about the case on 
your own. 
6. Finally, I instruct you again- do not make up your mind about what 
the verdict should be until after you have gone to the jury romn to decide the case 
and you and your fellow jurors have discussed the evidence. Keep an open mind 
until then. 
Now, we will begin by giving the lawyers for each side an opportunity to 
make their opening state1nents in which they may explain the issues in the case and 
summarize the facts they expect the evidence will show. These statements are 
intended to help you understand the issues and the evidence as it comes in, as well 
as the positions taken by both sides. So I ask that you now give the lawyers your 
close attention as I recognize them for purposes of opening statements. 
MUJI 1.8 (mod.) 
';:, VP 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is my duty to instruct you in the law that applies to this case, and it is your duty as 
jurors to follow the law as I state it to you, regardless of what you personally believe the law 
is or ought to be. On the other hand, it is your exclusive province to determine the facts in the 
case, and to consider and weigh the evidence for that purpose. 
The authority thus vested in you is not arbitrary power, but must be exercised with 
sincere judgment, sound discretion, and in accordance with the rules of law stated to you. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If in these instructions any rule, direction or idea is stated in varying ways, no 
emphasis thereon is intended, and none must be inferred by you. For that reason, you are not 
to single out any certain sentence, or any individual point or instruction, and ignore the other, 
but are to consider all the instructions as a whole, and to regard each in the light of all the 
others. 
The order in which the instructions are given has no significance as to their relative 
importance. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
--
You must not decide for or against anyone because you feel sorry for or angry at 
anyone. You must decide this case based on the facts and the law, without regard to 
sympathy, passion or prejudice. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
In this case the plaintiff is an individual and the defendant is a company. This should 
make no difference to you. You must decide this case as if it were between individuals. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Both parties to this case are entitled to equal justice under the law, and you have no 
right in arriving at your verdict to consider any matters except the evidence submitted to you 
in open court, and inferences that may reasonably be drawn therefrom, viewed in the light of 
and under the law as given you in these instructions. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You should not consider as evidence any statement of counsel made during the trial, 
unless such statement was made as an admission or stipulation conceding the existence of a 
fact or facts. 
You must not consider for any purpose any offer of evidence that was rejected, or any 
evidence that I have ruled should be stricken; such matter is to be treated as though you never 
had known of it. 
You are to decide this case solely upon the evidence that has been received, and the 
inferences that you may reasonably draw therefrom, and such presumptions as the law 
deduces therefrom, as noted in these instructions, and in accordance with the law as herein 
stated. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
At times throughout the trial I have been called upon to determine whether certain 
offered evidence might properly be admitted. You are not to be concerned with the reasons 
for such rulings and are not to draw any inferences from them. Whether offered evidence is 
admissible is purely a question of law. In admitting evidence to which an objection is made, I 
do not determine what weight should be given such evidence; nor do I pass on the credibility 
of the witness. You are not to consider evidence offered but not admitted, nor any evidence 
that I've stricken out; as to any question to which an objection was sustained, you must not 
conjecture as to what the answer might have been or as to the reason for the objection. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You are the exclusive judges of the credibility of the witnesses and the weight of the 
evidence. In judging the weight of the testimony and credibility of the witnesses, you have a 
right to take into consideration any biases, any interest in the result, and any motive or lack of 
motive to testify fairly. You may consider the witnesses' conduct while testifying before you, 
the reasonableness of their statements, their apparent frankness or candor, or the want of it, 
their opportunity to know, their ability to understand, and their capacity to remember. You 
should consider these matters you believe have a bearing on the truthfulness or accuracy of 
the witnesses' statements. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You may believe that a witness, on another occasion, made a statement inconsistent 
with that witness's testimony given here. That doesn't mean that you are required to 
disregard the testimony. It is for you to decide whether to believe the witness. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you believe any witness has intentionally testified falsely about any important 
matter, you may disregard the entire testimony of that witness, or you may disregard only the 
intentionally false testimony. 
'.,:., 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Depositions may be received in evidence. Depositions contain sworn testimony of a 
witness that was given previously, outside of court, with the lawyer for each party being 
entitled to ask questions. Testimony provided in a deposition may be read to you in court. 
You should consider deposition testimony the same way that you would consider the 
testimony of a witness testifying in court. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
A fact may be proved by direct or circumstantial evidence. Circumstantial evidence 
consists of facts or circumstances that allow someone to reasonably infer the truth of the facts 
to be proved. For example, if the fact to be proved is whether Johnny ate the cherry pie, and a 
witness testifies that she saw Johnny take a bite of the cherry pie, that is direct evidence of the 
fact. If the witness testifies that she saw Johnny with cherries smeared on his face and an 
empty pie plate in his hand, that is circumstantial evidence of the fact. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
When I tell you that a party has the burden of proof or that a party must prove 
something by a "preponderance of the evidence," I mean that the party must persuade you, by 
the evidence presented in court, that the fact is more likely to be true than not true. 
You may have heard that in a criminal case proof must be beyond a reasonable doubt, 
but I must emphasize to you that this is not a criminal case. In a civil case such as this one, a 
different level of proof applies: proof by a preponderance of the evidence. 
Another way of saying this is proof by the greater weight of the evidence, however 
slight. Weighing the evidence does not mean counting the number of witnesses nor the 
amount of testimony. Rather, it means evaluating the persuasive character of the evidence. In 
weighing the evidence, you should consider all of the evidence that applies to a fact, no matter 
which party presented it. The weight to be given to each piece of evidence is for you to 
decide. 
After weighing all of the evidence, if you decide that a fact is more likely true than 
not, then you must find that the fact has been proved. On the other hand, if you decide that 
the evidence regarding a fact is evenly balanced, then you must find that the fact has not been 
proved, and the party has therefore failed to meet its burden of proof to establish that fact. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
The rules of evidence do not ordinarily permit the opinions of a witness to be received 
as evidence. An exception to this rule exists in the case of expert witnesses. A witness who, 
by education, study, or experience, has become expert in some art, science, profession, 
calling, or subject matter, may state opinions as to any such matter in which that witness is 
qualified as an expert, so long as it is material and relevant to the case. You should consider 
such expert opinion and the reasons, if any, given for it. You are not bound by such an 
opinion. Give it the weight, if any, you think it deserves. If you should decide that the 
opinions of an expert witness are not based upon sufficient education and experience, or if 
you should conclude that the reasons given in support of the opinions are not sound, or that 
such opinions are outweighed by other evidence, you may disregard the opinion entirely. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Your job as jurors is, among other things, to decide whether Kachina Choate was 
harmed and, if so, whether anyone is at fault for that harm. If you decide that both she and 
ARS - Fresno LLC were at fault, you must then allocate fault between them. 
Fault means any wrongful act or failure to act that causes harm to the person seeking 
recovery. The wrongful act or failure to act alleged in this case is negligence. 
Your answers to the questions on the verdict form will determine, among other things, 
whether anyone was at fault. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Negligence means that a person did not use reasonable care. We all have a duty to use 
reasonable care to avoid injuring others. Reasonable care is simply what a reasonably careful 
person or company would do in a similar situation. A person may be negligent in acting or in 
failing to act. 
The amount of care that is reasonable depends upon the situation. Ordinary 
circumstances do not require extraordinary caution. But some situations require more care 
because a reasonably careful person would understand that more danger is involved. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Ms. Choate has the burden of proving, by the greater weight of the evidence, that 
ARS - Fresno LLC was at fault and that that fault was a cause of her damages. Ms. Choate 
also has the burden of proving, by the greater weight of the evidence, the amounts of her 
damages. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
ARS - Fresno LLC has the burden of proving, by the greater weight of the evidence, 
that Ms. Choate was herself at fault and that her fault was a cause of her damages. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
I've instructed you that the concept of fault includes a wrongful act or failure to act 
that causes harm. 
As used in the law, the word "cause" has a special meaning, and you must use this 
meaning whenever you apply the word. "Cause" means that: 
(1) the company's or person's act or failure to act produced the harm directly or 
set in motion events that produced the harm in a natural and continuous sequence; 
and 
(2) the company's or person's act or failure to act could be foreseen by a 
reasonable person to produce a harm of the same general nature. 
There may be more than one cause of the same harm. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
If you decide that both ARS - Fresno LLC and Kachina Choate had fault, you must 
decide the percentage of fault of each. This allocation of fault must be done on a percentage 
basis, and must total 100%. 
Ms. Choate' s total recovery, if any, will be reduced by the percentage of fault that you 
attribute to her. If you decide that Ms. Choate's fault is 50% or greater, she will recover 
nothing. 
When you answer the questions on damages, do not reduce the award by Ms. Choate's 
percentage of fault, if any. I will make that calculation later. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
I will now instruct you about damages. My instructions are given as a guide for 
calculating what damages should be if you find that Kachina Choate is entitled to them. 
However, if you decide that she is not entitled to recover damages, then you must disregard 
these instructions. 
If you decide that any ARS - Fresno LLC's fault caused Kachina Choate's harm, you 
must decide how much money will fairly and adequately compensate her for that harm. 
There are two kinds of damages: noneconomic and economic. 
JURY fNSTRUCTION NO. 
To be entitled to damages, Kachina Choate must prove two points: 
First, that damages occurred. There must be a reasonable probability, not just 
speculation, that Kachina Choate suffered damages from ARS - Fresno LLC's fault. 
Second, the amount of damages. The level of evidence required to prove the amount 
of damages is not as high as what is required to prove the occurrence of damages. There must 
still be evidence, not just speculation, that gives a reasonable estimate of the amount of 
damages, but the law does not require a mathematical certainty. 
In other words, if Kachina Choate has proved that she has been damaged and has 
established a reasonable estimate of those damages, ARS - Fresno LLC may not escape 
liability because of some uncertainty in the amount of damages. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
Noneconomic damages are the amount of money that will fairly and adequately 
compensate Ms. Choate for losses other than economic losses. 
Noneconomic damages are not capable of being exactly measured; and, though the 
lawyers are free to make whatever suggestions they see fit, be sure to keep in mind that there 
is really no fixed rule, standard or formula for them. Noneconomic damages must be awarded 
even though they may be difficult to compute. It is your duty to make this determination with 
calm and reasonable judgment. The law does not require the testimony of any witness to 
establish the amount of noneconomic damages. 
In awarding noneconomic damages, among the things that you may consider are: 
(1) the nature and extent of injuries; 
(2) the pain and suffering, both mental and physical; 
(3) the extent to which Ms. Choate has been prevented from pursuing her ordinary 
affairs; 
( 4) the degree and character of any disfigurement; 
(5) the extent to which Ms. Choate has been limited in the enjoyment of life; and 
(6) whether the consequences of these injuries are likely to continue and, if so, for how 
long. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
It is the duty of a person who has been injured to use reasonable diligence in caring for 
the injuries and reasonable means to prevent their aggravation and to accomplish healing. 
If an injured person does not use reasonable diligence to care for the injuries, and they 
are aggravated as a result of such failure, the liability, if any, of another whose act or omission 
was a cause of the original injury must be limited to the amount of damage that would have 
been suffered if the injured person had exercised the required diligence. 
ARS - Fresno LLC has the burden of proof regarding his contention that Ms. Choate 
has failed reasonably to mitigate her damages. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
You shall award damages in an amount that fully compensates Ms. Choate. Do not 
speculate on or consider any other possible sources of benefit Ms. Choate may have received. 
After you have returned your verdict, I will make whatever adjustments may be necessary. 
JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
According to mortality tables, a person of Ms. Choate's age and gender is expected to 
live approximately 39 more years. You may consider this fact in deciding the amount of 
future damages. A life expectancy is merely an estimate of the average remaining life of all 
persons in our country of a given age and gender, with average health and exposure to danger. 
Some people live longer and others die sooner. You may also consider all other evidence 
bearing on the expected life of Ms. Choate, including her occupation, health, habits, life style, 
and other activities. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you go into the jury room, your first task is to select a foreperson. The 
foreperson will preside over your deliberations and sign the verdict form when it's completed. 
The foreperson should not dominate the discussions. The foreperson's opinions should be 
given the same weight as the opinions of the other jurors. 
After you select the foreperson you must discuss with one another-that is, 
deliberate-with a view to reaching an agreement. Your attitude and conduct during 
discussions are very important. 
As you begin your discussions, it is not helpful to say that your mind is already made 
up. Do not announce that you are determined to vote a certain way or that your mind cannot 
be changed. Each of you must decide the case for yourself, but only after discussing the case 
with your fellow jurors. 
Do not hesitate to change your opinion when convinced that it is wrong. Likewise, 
you should not surrender your honest convictions just to end the deliberations or to agree with 
other jurors. 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
When you deliberate, do not flip a coin, speculate or choose one juror's opinions at 
random. Evaluate the evidence and come to a decision that is supported by the evidence. 
If you decide that a party is entitled to recover damages~ you must then agree upon the 
amount of money to award that party. Each of you should state your own independent 
judgment on what the amount should be. You must thoughtfully consider the amounts 
suggested, evaluate them according to these instructions and the evidence, and reach an 
agreement on the amount. You must not agree in advance to average the estimates . 
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JURY INSTRUCTION NO. 
I am going to give you a form called the Verdict that contains several questions and 
instructions. You must answer the questions based upon the instructions and the evidence you 
have seen and heard during this trial. 
Because this is not a criminal case, your Verdict does not have to be unanimous. At 
least six jurors must agree on the answer to each question, but they do not have to be the same 
six jurors on each question. 
As soon as six or more of you agree on the answer to all of the required questions, the 
foreperson should sign and date the Verdict form and tell the bailiff you have finished. The 
bailiff will escort you back to this courtroom; you should bring the completed Verdict with 
you. 
If you feel the need to communicate with me, you should do so through your 
foreperson. 
Thank you for your service. 
Dated this __ day of June, 2015. 
PAIGE PETERSEN 
Third District Judge 
